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1\..PPEAI~ from a judgment of the 
Arnold 
Action for damages for malicious nT'n>:C•i•HtH\ 
for defendant after sustaining demurrer to 
leave to affirmed. 
Joseph K. Coady for Appellant. 
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. 
Bayard Rhone and Norman Sokolow, 
eral, for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-In this action for damages for 
cious prosecution, plaintiff has appealed from the 
entered in favor of defendant following an order 
defendant's demurrer without leave to amend. 
defendant According to the allegations of the 
maliciously and without probable cause "'"·""''"'" the 
tion of two criminal proceedings against In both 
proceedings the charges were based upqn events which al-
legedly occurred on October 3, 1948. The first 
filed in the Municipal Court of the of 
October 5, 1948, charged plaintiff with violated section 
481 of the 1<-,isll and Game Code, in that he had 
certain petroleum matter, deleterious to fish and 
in the waters of the State of California. On October 
that proceeding was dismissed. On 
ant, by sworn affidavit, caused a second nr<)CeeCUnQ' 
tuted in the United States District Court for 
District of California, charging with 
section 407 of 33 U.S.C. (pollution of 
July 19, 1949, plaintiff was acquitted in the second 
ing. 
Game Comm lmmnnc 
nwlieious prosPr~11iioll nf said eriminal 
Plaintiff contr•nds first ilw t}; .. rlnetrinc· 
··iYil vuilahle to defenchmt 
<'ither her•allSil <lcfm1dant is at he;:;t a 
and ser:onrL 1lnJ.t in any rYcnt s:1irt ({<wtrin•• has nn 
to the in tlw ferlC>ral r:ourt ns r!efelJ(T:ml 
11·ithout the 'Wopc nf his 
in that conrt W ,, lwve 
<·tmteniinm; cannot be sm;tainecL 
Tn support of his first 1:ontt:ntion. plaintiff cites nnr1 rr>li0s 
npon C'Prtain fonnd in Prentice Y 50 Cal. 
App.2d 344, :349 1128 P.2d qrn. hnL a~ lwrr>inafter in<1ientf'<l. 
we be1ir,.,, that so,mll r•·asnnR of pnbliP tlm.t a 
pew·e offirer. or ,,ther (\fficial. lw f'rlif'lded the 
r•loak of malieirm~ 
rro:;;N·ntion. onts0t. w•~ ar•' f:cwN1 with an <lpparent 
·~onf:liet brctWf~r·n the publi(· of ind1virlna 1 
eitizens from offieiaJ aetion and the w011 
established polie:v of promoting· tlw fearless anrl effpetive :11l· 
ministration of the 1aw for tlw whole people 
publir· offlerrs from Yindietive a11rt ret:1liatorv :mit~. 
Hmn•wr. inc feel that hoih poli1dr·s may at Oil!'!' lw r-mh''<'l'veil 
hy refnsin;:t to pPrmit eiYi1 a<:tions fllf• officer for nl· 
lr•ged mali<•ions an<l rcrnnnding t1~t• offr•ndefl inrli 
drlnnl to his iR. Q:",, l'PIL 
Code. ~ 170.) 
[1] When tli•· du1 l'l'ill1e and tn mditut 
<·timinal is i1• offiPfT. it is 
for tl!e lwst interests of the wt!Ole that hP b1• 
p1·oteeted from }w !'aSSlll(•Jlt in of that d 11ty. 
'l'!JP effiPient. fmw\ of our sys1~'m of: law <'nfm·,•pmr>nt 





WP an• aware 




at an times under the whole-
of called tn account 
ousted from 
101 Kan. 11 117 
larly, 
ei vii actions for 
Booth. 56 CaL 65 
of 
!37 C.2d 
fires. was immune; and 
an assistant engi~ 
and a fire inspector were 
their official duties eneompassed 
erirnes and the institution of 
, in v. 0 supra, 
!)9 B'.2d J agPnt of the F'ederal Bureau of Investi~ 
was held to be included within the cloak of immunity. 
rrhe court there stated: ''The administration of criminal jus-
tice would be without the active partieipation of 
public officials dt•rmrtments concerned with the 
enforcement of laws ... lt is the of all citi-
zens to reYeal such eYidence. of which they may have knowl-
edge, at the risk of guilty of misprision of felony for 
failing to do so. In the ease of an official, his failure to act 
under such circumstances would, in addition, constitute seri-
ous ma1feasanee in office•." (99 P.2d 135, 140.) 
\Vhile there is in Prentice v. Bertken, supra, 50 
Cal.App.2d whieh lends support to plaintiff's position, 
sueh is out of with the majority view which 
<'Stablishes the sounder rule, anrl therefore that language must 
be disapproved. 
'"l'he doetrine of immunity is not for the benefit of the 
few who might other\vise bP compelled to answer in dam-
ages. It is for the benefit of aU to whom it applies, that they 
may be free to aet in the exereise of honest judgment uninfiu. 
eneed fear of consequences personal to themRelves. This 
again is not for their personal or benefit. It is 
only that may be enabled to render a better public ser~ 
yiee." (Pearson v. Reed, supra. 6 Cal.App.2d 277, 288.) 
[3] Although public policy demands that the peaee officer 
be free from liability in eivil actions for alleged malicious 
prosecution. such policy does not go so far as to free the offend-
ing officer from all liability, for it has long been the law in 
this state that, '' very person who maliciously and without 
probable cause procur-es a search-warrant or warrant of arrest 
to be issued 
to sneh ar·tion \nmld 
better iban ~would a re;o;ort 
ifh Y supra. 101 
also the d ireet claim that the 
of the doetrine of r'ivi1 eonstitutes a 
to\Yard the 1:reation of a " state." 
[4] It is also vvPll 0stahlished that a offieer is liable 
for caused the scope of his 
authority. ( 67 C . .T .S. ~ 1 , .. 
supra, 1:38 1'~.2d mn ; supra, 99 F.2d 1 
1:37-138.) [5] HO\n'Ycr. sreonr1 eontention that 
rh•f(mdant Towers waR acting outside the scope of his 
m in the federal r'onrt is without merit 
The allege(\ 
tlw State of California whieh were under the c'oncurrent 
rlietion of the state and federal J. II endry 
,-~ J!oorc. :JL'i r.S. 10:1 ; United 
Rtatcs v. Carrillo, lB v. 14 CaL 
2!1 617 [96 P.2(! 9411.1 Defendant Towers was no less dis-
t•ha rging his laws for the of 
fiRll and g-ame 
tlwn lw wonlrl 
1nter1 in the Rtate r~om·is. [6] "Duties of officA include 
thosr' lying- "·it11in its scope. those essential to arcom-
pliflhment of the mRin purpofles for whi0h the offler was created. 
and those whiel1, although only inridental and flerve 
to promote thr of th <' purposes." 
(Nesbitt F'nt£t Products v. 1YallrtN. 17 F.Supp. 141. 
lt would b" an anomalnnR dor·trinP whieh would pnhlic 
nffiePr <J(·t•ess an~· eoni'titntrd tribnnR 1 witl1 
dir~tion oHr H1e a that said officer 
was a state officer 
eeeding in the federal 
ing to diseharge hiR duty 
A somewhat similar 
Norton v. HofFmann, 
deputy 
authorization of the 
in the state eourtR. 
and in 




1949. is t}Je 
have occurred 
him was filed 
filed in April, 
as au investigator, 
IU UUUlldllllL 
to arrest him while within the scope 
What if the had alleged that de-
fendant was an " " ( § 20) of the Fish and Game 
Commission and had incorporated defendant's affidavit in 
which it was averred that he ~was employed as a janitor in the 
offices of the commission 7 Would this court then assume that 
on the day the prosecution was commenced, 
and within the scope of his authority so that immunity 
from civil liability could be extended to him 1 Probably. 
It has been specifically held in this state that deputy fish 
and game commissioners are liable in damages for unlawfully 
eonfiseating fish, and for torts eommitted in eonneetion with 
sueh eonfiseation, even though they acted under a mistaken 
bt~licf that the confiscation was proper (Noack v. Zellerbach, 
11 Cal.App.2d 186, 188 P.2d 986] [hearing denied] ; Silva 
v. J1acAuley, 135 Cal.App. 249 [26 P.2d 887, 27 P.2d 791] 
l hearing ) . Assuming for the moment that an inves-
tigator is a deputy, if deputies are liable in damages when 
are in faith, albeit mistakenly, why should 
they not be held liable if the aetion is taken with malice? The 
Hestatement of Torts ( § 656 ) states that only public prose-
cutors are immune from such liability and that the immunity 
does not apply to all persons whose function it is to aid in the 
enforcement of the eriminal law. While it may be admitted 
that malicious proseeution is a disfavored action, the policy 
should not be further to the extreme of practical nulli-
fieation of the and the consequent defeat of the other im-
portant policy which underlies of protecting the individual 
from the injury eaused unjustifiable criminal prosecution 
18 Cal.2d 146, 159 [114 P.2d 335, 135 A.L.R. 
v. Gm·dino, 56 Cal.App.2d 667, 672 [113 
; Pnlvermachet· v. Los Angeles Co-ordinating Corn-
. The plaintiff here should have been permitted 
I'Pllledy Ull<li•!' 
~;l7 ! :.lO:i P . 
. \pp.2d HO 
I ib, tu ll1ne 
iutiff ha~ f>,.,.JJ 
j (<l'llf'\' Oi' . ' 
ag·a i nst otl<' of l! i~ subord i nat<·s 
by ;JIJ unwarranted 
i j 
aetion 
at tfl(, rc•<tnest of one injured 
'""'"'''""ly where the prosecu-
tor l1as rl'lit•il upon tlw t1•stinwny of the as a basis 
for tlw did sue-
•·<·ed in a 
tlon ht• of any 
lH'l'IJ mali,•ious 
111 his r···pHlation. but in 
lJ,·,~n 11111 I() nf 
ttll fouw lr·d 
lw '' 1•indir·t in; 
.'uil The n·w·rse sitnniion 
emplo.l'el'. ,.],•rk. 
is. hy this hold 
37 C.2d- ·24 
the eonvi<,· 
who has 
malicious action than is defendant in a crimi-
The Pish and Game for ca<~n'p~c 
that the attorney for the Division of Fish 
and Game shall act as counsel in defense of any officer or 
in any suit for damages such officer 
or to have occurred as the result of the negli-
genee or misconduct of the officer or deputy while engaged in 
the of his official duties. But a private individual 
who has been subjected to malicious and unwarranted criminal 
has no such free defense avalaible to him. He 
at his own expense, hire his own lawyer and pay his own 
costs. I am at a loss to understand how the problematical 
"resort to such penal action" (Pen. Code, § 170) provides 
"some measure of protection for the individual citizen" and 
how it "would subserve the public interest far better than 
would a resort to civil litigation against the public officer." 
(:Majority opinion.) 
The plaintiff contends, and I agree, that the holding in this 
ease is a major step toward statism. This case extends the 
doe trine of immunity to one who labels himself an "investi-
gator" on the assumption that such an employee is a deputy 
commissioner acting within the scope of his authority in bring-
ing such an action. One has only to read the cases cited by the 
majority to see how the doctrine has been unnecessarily 
stretched and expanded to cover almost any type of employee. 
For this court to reach out and extend immunity from civil 
liability under the pleadings in this case, is to lay a foundation 
for an extension of the privilege that is, to my mind, unthink-
able. The protection of individual rights should be zealously 
guarded from unwarranted poliee action, and the privilege 
of police immunity should be available only to those whose 
clear-eut duty it is to apprehend violators of the laws of this 
state. The privilege of immunity should not be extended to 
those whose duties, power and authority are undefined. 
Under the pleadings in the case at hand, plaintiff was en-
titled to proceed to trial f.or a determination of the questions 
of fact presented, and I would ther('fore reverse the judgment 
and direct the trial court to overrule the demurrer. 





21909. In Bank. 4, 
(la, lb] Labor-Definitions-Laborer.-The me:an:mg of the word 
"laborer'' is not fixed in its and it neeessary in 
each situation to look to eontext in which the term 
used to ascertain its ll<v<>.UiJi,.,. 
[2] Id.-Definitions-Laborer.-While the >V'Drd "laborer" is com-
used to one whose work demands 
toil rather than it is also 
work which a 
exertion as from one who dettenlis 
on the exercise of mental faculties to ae<mnlpltsn 
and in a more sense it ineludes 
who with their brains as well as those who 
manual work. 
[3] Mechanics' Liens-Bonds.-Where a bond exi>re<>SlY states that 
it was for the of complying 
lien law Civ. § 1183 et 
statute are to be read into the bond and 
tion and effect. 
[ 4] !d.-Persons Entitled-Laborers.~ In Code 
mechanic's 
the terms of the 
its mt:enJreta.-
that materialmen . . . and all 'Pel'SOllS 
and laborers of every class labor 
Skill Or Other Or o11T'nl~:IUYIP' HJC<1>vtCUilii> 
power ... shall have a lien upon 
